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1. Introduction 
The economic literature on targeting has largely been dealing with poverty alleviation, see e.g. Besley 
and Kanbur (1993). In this context the purpose of targeting is to identify who is poor and target 
benefits towards that group. Among others, Akerlof (1978) and Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) have 
argued that targeting can improve the efficiency of income redistribution. However, this approach 
requires that public authorities are able to observe some characteristic that is correlated with ability 
and income. 
 
Not only cash transfers, but also in-kind transfers can be targeted on selected groups. One of the most 
striking aspects of in-kind programs is how widespread and important they are, see Currie and Gahvari 
(2008). A property of public service provision is that information constraints might be overcome in the 
production process. This is due to the extensive information that public authorities collect in order to 
adjust services to recipients and to monitor the outcome of service production. 
 
Although in-kind benefits can indeed be targeted in order to alleviate poverty, the distribution of 
public services is frequently motivated by reference to “needs”, where “needs” can be interpreted as a 
disadvantage in the capability to function. According to Sen (1992) capabilities represent the various 
combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Examples of such 
functionings are to move about, being adequately nourished, being in good health, having self-respect 
and to participate in social life. In so far as functionings are constitutive of well-being, capability 
represents a person’s freedom to achieve well-being. Thus one can argue that important public 
services like education and health care provide citizens with basic capabilities. People that lack 
education or suffer from serious health problems are disadvantaged in terms of capabilities, even if 
they do rather well in terms of commodities, income and utility. As noted by Sen (1992) and Roemer 
(1998), the basic diversity of human beings implies that equal consideration for all may demand very 
unequal treatment in favor of the disadvantaged. 
 
Targeting of public services can be defined as any unequal distribution of public services in a given 
population. Van de Walle (1998) discusses the distinction between broad targeting and narrow 
targeting. Broad targeting denotes the allocation of budgets among categories of public spending, and 
narrow targeting entails targeting categories of people. For the purpose of this paper it is also relevant 
to introduce a conceptual distinction between take-up targeting and treatment targeting. Take-up 
targeting means that transfers are provided to a selected group of people either based on observable 
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characteristics or based on self-targeting.1 By contrast, treatment targeting entails that different 
recipients are given unequal treatment. A common assumption in theoretical analysis of publicly 
provided goods is that recipients receive equal spending and are given equal treatment. This 
assumption is, however, at odds with the observation that important public services like health care, 
child care, education and care for the elderly and disabled are normally provided unequally to 
recipients with different diagnoses and/or abilities. In order to accommodate this salient feature of 
public service provision, this paper aims to discuss different allocation principles that may justify the 
widespread practice of unequal treatment. The analysis focuses on treatment targeting, while take up is 
assumed to be universal or based on exogenous observable characteristics. 
 
Treatment targeting has earlier been analyzed by Arrow (1971).  In his approach a basic assumption is 
that utility of each individual depends on public expenditure on the individual and some personal 
characteristics, termed ability. A utilitarian social welfare function is applied to the study of optimal 
public expenditure policy. The present paper employs a similar framework, where public expenditures 
can be targeted on individuals with different ability to produce service outcomes. Public expenditure is 
treated as an input in the production of service outcomes or final output, where final output is a good 
or a functioning that is contributing to well-being. Individuals with different ability are assumed to be 
sorted into case-mix groups or target groups that constitute different ability types. This assumption 
facilitates the comparison of the production functions of different target groups. However, unlike 
Arrow’s approach the present paper is not based on utilitarianism. 
 
Based on a review of the limited empirical evidence, Currie and Gahvari (2008) argue that paternalism 
is a leading overall explanation for the existence of in-kind transfers. Paternalism may signify that 
government decision-makers care about the distribution of some goods on individuals. Thus in-kind 
transfers become instruments to depart from consumer sovereignty in the allocation of merit goods. A 
related idea is the notion of specific egalitarianism. Tobin (1970) argues that while many people have 
no problem with income inequality per se, they would like to see that all individuals receive adequate 
food, medical services, or housing. Similarly, Kelman (1986) postulates that individuals have rights to 
certain specific things, not to the cash equivalent of these things. 
 
If public authorities are motivated by paternalism, specific egalitarianism or provision of capabilities, 
it is relevant to develop a decision-model where public authorities care about service outcomes rather 
                                                     
1 In the case of self-targeting, the government relies on individuals to identify themselves as needy. By imposing costs on the 
recipients or by the nature of the good itself, there are created disincentives for the non-targeted group to participate. 
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than individual utilities derived from these outcomes. Such a model differs from the utilitarian 
approach of Arrow (1971) by being non-welfarist.2 An advantage of the non-welfarist approach is that 
it does not require interpersonal comparability of utility, unlike social evaluation based on the 
utilitarian decision model. 
 
In the non-welfarist model it is assumed that public authorities are concerned about the distribution of 
service outcomes. However, to achieve equality of outcome is not necessarily the only objective in the 
allocation of public services. Another important concern might be efficiency, which is achieved by 
maximization of aggregate production that is provided for a given total expenditure. When 
disadvantaged groups have comparably low productivity in the production of service outcomes, there 
is a conflict between equity in service outcomes and high aggregate production. This is due to the fact 
that the marginal cost for increased production in low-ability groups is higher than marginal cost in 
high-ability groups, provided that equality of outcome is satisfied. Consequently a redistribution of 
spending that leads to a small decrease in service outcomes for low-ability types may facilitate a 
comparably large increase in service outcomes for high-ability types. 
 
This type of trade-off has previously been discussed by Shoup (1964) and Behrman and Craig (1987), 
who provide analyses of the distribution of police resources across neighborhoods. Behrman and Craig 
(BC) define the trade-off between equity and productivity as a property of the local governmental 
utility function. The equity goal requires that the safety level is equalized across neighborhoods, 
whereas the concern for productivity requires focus on the aggregate city-wide safety. This paper 
demonstrates that the discussion of equity-productivity trade-off can be generalized to other types of 
public services than police services. This paper, however, deviates from the approach of BC by 
assuming that target groups are homogeneous when the relevant characteristic is ability. In BC 
heterogeneous neighborhoods play the role of target groups. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to combine the idea of Arrow (1971) that public services can be 
targeted on ability types with the notion of equity-productivity trade-off developed by Shoup (1964) 
and Behrman and Craig (1987). The implications of a government that is motivated by high aggregate 
production of the publicly provided good and/or equity in the distribution of public service outcomes 
are explored. Furthermore, the analysis exposes the conditions that determine the significance of the 
equity-productivity trade-off. The decisive condition is called technological dominance, which entails 
                                                     
2 Welfarism is the view that the goodness of a state of affairs can be judged entirely by the goodness of utilities in that state, 
see Sen (2006). 
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that there is a positive relationship between ability to produce service outcomes (output level) and 
marginal productivity of the production functions of the respective ability types. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that target groups with a high initial output have a low marginal productivity, and that target 
groups with a low initial output have a high marginal productivity in the production of service 
outcomes. Then the technological dominance condition is violated, and the significance of the equity-
productivity trade-off is reduced or in some cases is even entirely removed. 
 
Finally, governmental preference for public services is applied to the linear expenditure system 
derived from a Stone-Geary utility function. It is demonstrated that this specification provides 
attractive interpretations of the preference parameters. Public authorities may determine the model 
parameters in order to satisfy different allocation principles. The community preference framework is 
also shown to allow compromises between different allocation principles. It will be justified that this 
modeling framework will form an attractive basis for empirical applications. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the technology for producing service outcomes 
or final output. Section 3 presents the allocation problem faced by public authorities when they have to 
prioritize among target groups, and introduces several principles of allocation. Section 4 demonstrates 
that the benchmark allocation principles are consistent with special versions of a community 
preference model. It is assumed that public authorities have preferences that are defined over the 
distribution of expenditures on target groups, and that utility is maximized subject to a budget 
constraint. A brief conclusion is given in Section 5. 
2. Production of a publicly provided private good 
Assume that a private good is produced by a subordinate public organization, like a public school, 
hospital, nursing home, kindergarten or local government. This lower level of government has the 
discretion to determine the service allocation on recipients, whereas the budget constraint (total 
expenditure) of the service producing entity is determined by a higher level of government. Thus the 
higher level of government decides the general priorities across different types of services and/or 
across geographic areas. However, the decision of how much to spend on different recipients requires 
detailed knowledge of each recipient. Adjustment of production to recipients is therefore decentralized 
to the lower level of government. The public service is assumed to be provided free of charge. 
Furthermore, the service is provided exclusively by the public sector, so there is little scope for 
topping up or opting out with private provision. 
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The public service producer may divide potential recipients into target groups according to socio-
demographic characteristics. Such characteristics may include age, gender, family background, 
neighborhood, country background, diagnoses, abilities and skills. This kind of information is assumed 
to be collected as part of the production process. Depending on the degree of homogeneity, members 
of a given target group are given similar treatment by the service producer. This means that members 
of a sufficiently homogenous target group receive an equal amount of spending and output. Such a 
distribution is based on the principle of horizontal equity, which requires equal treatment of equals.3 
 
Total income y equals total expenditure, and is measured per person in the population for which the 
public service producer is responsible. Spending is allocated on r target groups subject to the budget 
constraint 
(1) 
1
r
j j
j
z y y
=
=∑ , 
where yj is spending per person in target group j, and zj is the population share that belongs to target 
group j. 
 
What remains is to determine the distribution of expenditure on target groups. Following Arrow 
(1971), it is assumed that recipients use public expenditure as an input in the production of service 
outcomes (or final output). This transformation process is described by the production functions 
(2) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
, 0, 0, 1,2,..., ,
, 1,2,..., ,
j j j j j
j j j
j j
j j
x f y f f j r
y f y
y j r
f y
ε
′ ′′= > < =
′= =  
where xj is the production of final output per person in target group j and εj is the elasticity of the 
production function. The production function is increasing and concave in expenditure. Moreover, the 
production function is specific to the target group, which means that final output and marginal 
productivity may differ across target groups for a given expenditure per person.4 
 
                                                     
3 As a special case each target group may include only one individual. Thus the assumption of horizontal equity is not a 
necessary condition in the model. However, this paper focuses on inequities across rather than within target groups. 
4 The target group specific production functions correspond to the assumption in Arrow (1971) that production depends on 
public expenditure on a given individual and ability of the individual. However, the specification in this paper does not 
preclude intersecting production functions, although non-intersecting production functions are imposed as an additional 
restriction defined by ability dominance. 
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In order to allocate total expenditure on target groups, it is required to compare the production 
functions of different target groups. A striking feature of public service allocation is that target groups 
have different ability in producing final output. For instance, the multi-handicapped or severely 
disabled may need much more aid than other target groups to produce a given level of knowledge as 
measured by test scores in public schools. Moreover, the same groups also need intensive care to 
achieve normal functionings of daily living. 
 
In order to compare target groups, it is useful to introduce the following concepts. 
 
Definition 1: Conditional ability ranking. Assume that ( )jf g  and ( )kf g  are production functions of 
two different target groups j and k, and g is expenditure per person. Then target group j is said to have 
conditionally higher ability than target group k for a given level of g if ( ) ( )j kf g f g> . 
 
Note that definition 1 presupposes that the target groups are treated equally (receive equal spending 
per person). Hence the definition does not preclude intersecting production functions, which implies 
that conditional ability rankings are reversed at some expenditure level. 
 
Definition 2: Ability dominance. Assume that ( )jf g  and ( )kf g  are production functions of two 
different target groups j and k, and g is expenditure per person. Then target group j is said to be ability 
dominant and to have generally higher ability than target group k if ( ) ( ) 0j kf g f g g> ∀ > . 
 
Definition 3. Productivity dominance. Assume that ( )jf g′  and ( )kf g′  are marginal productivities of 
the production functions of two different target groups j and k, and g is expenditure per person. Then 
target group j is said to be productivity dominant and to have higher productivity than target group k if 
( ) ( ) 0j kf g f g g′ ′> ∀ > . 
 
Definition 4. Elasticity dominance. Assume that ( )j gε  and ( )k gε  are elasticities of the production 
functions of two different target groups j and k, and g is expenditure per person. Then target group j is 
said to be elasticity dominant and to have higher output elasticity than target group k if 
( ) ( ) 0j kg g gε ε> ∀ > . 
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Definition 5. Weak technological dominance. Target group j is said to exert weak technological 
dominance over target group k, if (i) target group j is ability dominant to target group k, and (ii) target 
group j is productivity dominant to target group k. (See definitions 2 and 3.) 
 
Definition 6. Strong technological dominance. Target group j is said to exert strong technological 
dominance over target group k, if (i) target group j is ability dominant to target group k, and (ii) target 
group j is elasticity dominant to target group k. (See definitions 2 and 4.) 
 
The definition of weak technological dominance means that the vertical distance between two 
production functions is always increasing as the level of expenditure is increasing. If there is strong 
technological dominance, the percentage increase in final output as expenditure per person increases 
with 1 percent, is always larger for a high-ability group than for a low-ability group. Weak 
technological dominance is implied by strong technological dominance, but the reverse implication is 
not true. 
3. Allocation of expenditure and production on target groups 
Public authorities may want to compensate low-ability groups for their disadvantage in producing 
service outcomes. Thus, the principle of vertical equity is defined by unequal treatment of unequals in 
order to achieve equal outcomes. The distribution of expenditure across target groups is not 
necessarily based on equal treatment. As alternatives, consider the following principles of allocation 
among target groups. 
 
Definition 7. Equality of treatment (ET): Members of different target groups receive equal 
expenditure per person, ( , )j ky y j k= ∀ . 
 
Definition 8. Equality of outcome (EO): Members of different target groups receive equal final output 
per person, ( , )j kx x j k= ∀ . 
 
Definition 9. Equality of marginal cost (EMC): The cost of a marginal increase in final output is equal 
for all target groups, ( ) ( )1 1 ( , )j j k kf y f y j k′ ′= ∀ . 
 
It follows from definition 9 that under EMC, the marginal productivity is equalized for different target 
groups. Thus EMC focuses exclusively on productivity and is not concerned with vertical equity. At 
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the other extreme, EO is concerned with vertical equity and disregards differences in the marginal 
productivity. 
 
The meaning of EMC can be further explored by introducing aggregate production per person in the 
population 
(3) 
1
r
j j
j
x z x
=
=∑ , 
where x is the average of production per person in different target groups weighted by their respective 
population shares. Assume that the public service producer is maximizing average production for a 
given total cost y, or alternatively, that the public service producer is minimizing the cost to produce a 
given average production. It can be shown that either optimizing problem leads to first order 
conditions that require EMC to be fulfilled. This solution means that the marginal productivity is equal 
for all target groups. Moreover, high-ability groups may receive more spending per person than low-
ability groups. High priority of high-ability groups follows from the assumptions of weak 
technological dominance and concave production functions. When the cost of producing an extra unit 
of final output is comparably low for high-ability groups at a given level of spending per person, the 
cost minimizing or average production maximizing service provider is distributing a high share of 
resources to high-ability groups, while low-ability groups are given a low priority. 
3.1. Technological dominance 
When the conditions for technological dominance are fulfilled, the service provider has to decide 
whether he should target more spending on high-ability groups or on low-ability groups. In the former 
case, high aggregate production is achieved at the cost of high outcome inequality, whereas in the 
latter case welfare of disadvantaged groups is improved at the cost of lower aggregate production. This 
is the equity-productivity trade-off for public services. 
 
The equity-productivity trade-off is displayed in Figure 1. For a given level of total income, it is 
assumed that spending is allocated on two different target groups with production functions ( )1 1f y  
and ( )2 2f y . For simplicity the two target groups are assumed to have equal size ( )1 2z z= . Moreover, 
it is assumed that target group 1 is exerting technological dominance over target group 2. Expenditure 
received is measured from the left to the right for group 1 and from the right to the left for group 2. 
Thus expenditure received by the two groups is restricted by the total resource constraint, given by 
equation (1). 
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Figure 1.  Allocation of expenditure on two target groups based on equal outcome (EO), equal 
treatment (ET) or equal marginal cost (EMC) 
EO ET EMC
Final output
Expenditure
f1 (y1)
f2 (y2)
EOx
ETx2
EMCx2
ETx1
EMCx1
 
 
The EO solution is where the two production functions intersect in the diagram. In this case the two 
groups achieve equal final output. This requires a high priority of the low-ability group, which 
receives a high share of total expenditure. 
 
The EMC solution is where the slopes of the two production functions are equal (in absolute value), 
and where the sum of the two production functions reaches its maximum. This requires a high priority 
of the high-ability group, which receives a high share of total expenditure. Accordingly, the 
distribution of final output exhibits large outcome inequality. 
 
The ET solution allocates half of total expenditure to group 1, and the other half to group 2. Due to 
technological dominance group 1 produces more final output than group 2, but inequality in the 
distribution of final output is smaller than under EMC. 
3.2. Violation of technological dominance 
The relationship between ability and marginal productivity is not necessarily positive. Define the 
initial endowment of a target group by the outcome that is produced at zero public expenditure. This 
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initial endowment may vary across target groups and ability types, either because of different inherited 
ability or because of different prior investments in health and/or human capital that affect ability. 
Moreover, in the case of health related services, variation in initial endowments may result from 
negative health shocks that are more or less accidental. 
 
If a target group with a low initial endowment has a high marginal productivity, whereas another 
target group with high initial endowment has a low marginal productivity in the production of service 
outcomes, the equity-productivity trade-off may vanish. Such a case is shown in Figure 2, which is 
defined similarly as Figure 1, except that the production functions ( )1 1f y  and ( )2 2f y  have been 
changed. In Figure 2, it is assumed that target group 1 has a higher initial endowment and is ability 
dominant to target group 2, whereas target group 2 is productivity dominant to target group 1. 
 
Figure 2.  Allocation of expenditure on two target groups based on equal outcome (EO), equal 
treatment (ET) or equal marginal cost (EMC) 
ETx1
ETx2
EMCEO xx =
EO=EMC ET
Expenditure
Final output
f1 (y1)
f2 (y2)
 
 
The EO solution is where the two production functions intersect in the diagram. However, the 
production functions have been constructed such that the EO solution in this case coincides with the 
EMC solution. Thus the figure illustrates that there is not necessarily a conflict between EO and EMC. 
Both a low initial endowment and a high marginal productivity (for a given expenditure per person) 
13 
require that target group 2 should be given a high priority. Correspondingly, target group 1 should be 
given a low priority due to a high initial endowment and a low marginal productivity in the production 
of final output. 
 
The ET solution allocates half of total expenditure to group 1, and the other half to group 2. This 
solution gives a higher priority to target group 1 and a lower priority to target group 2 as compared to 
the EO and EMC solution. At the ET solution, it is possible to increase both aggregate production and 
equity in the distribution of final output by a transfer of spending from target group 1 to target group 2. 
4. Preferences for targeting 
It is not clear whether any of the allocation principles ET, EO or EMC is predominant in the decisions 
made by public authorities. Targeting policies may vary across public service sectors, and also across 
government jurisdictions and service producing agents. Moreover, it is likely that public sector 
behavior involves compromises between the benchmark allocation principles. As is demonstrated by 
Figure 1, the EO and EMC principles might produce very different results. Provided that target group 
rankings satisfy technological dominance, the goals of high aggregate final output and low inequality 
in final output have to be balanced against each other. Even in cases where EO and EMC are not in 
conflict, as shown in Figure 2, service producers might still wish to balance ET against EO (and 
EMC). 
 
In order to analyze targeting policies, a decision model that provides a solution to the allocation 
problem is called for. This paper assumes that in-kind transfers are motivated by paternalism, specific 
egalitarianism or a version of non-welfarism, in which public authorities care about the distribution of 
the publicly provided good on individuals. To account for such preferences the "community 
preference" model emerges as an appropriate candidate.5 The model treats public authorities like 
households that maximize utility for a given budget constraint. Standard applications of this model 
include studies of resource allocation on private and public consumption, and resource allocation on 
different public service sectors. Expenditure composition problems in the public sector are treated 
similarly to consumer choices in the private sector. 
 
Assume that preferences of the public service producer are represented by the Stone-Geary utility 
function 
                                                     
5 For a discussion of the community preference model, see Wildasin (1986). 
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(4) 
( )
1
1
log ,
1,
r
j j j
j
r
j
j
W yβ α
β
=
=
= −
=
∑
∑
 
where W is utility and βj and αj are preference parameters. The Stone-Geary utility function is a 
convenient choice, since it keeps the model simple and parsimonious in parameters. As will be 
demonstrated below the model parameters have attractive interpretations in terms of targeting 
behavior. Moreover, as demonstrated in Section 4.5 the model is useful for empirical applications even 
in cases where data on final output are lacking. 
 
The purpose of this part of the analysis is to examine how preferences for different allocation 
principles can be captured by a linear expenditure system. Note that preferences of the public authority 
are defined over expenditure per person received by different target groups. Thus preferences for 
different allocation principles are assumed to be captured indirectly by the preference parameters. This 
assumption makes it possible to retain standard properties of the expenditure system. 
 
Equation (4) states that utility is increasing with higher group-specific spending. However, since total 
expenditure is restricted by the budget constraint, the public authority has to make priorities across 
target groups. Thus, utility in equation (4) is maximized subject to the budget constraint (1). This leads 
to the linear expenditure system 
(5) ( )
1
, 1,2,..., .
r
j j j j j j j
j
z y z y z j rα β α
=
⎛ ⎞= + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Each αj-parameter is interpreted as minimum expenditure per person in target group j, and j jzα  is 
group specific minimum expenditure per person in the population. Discretionary income is the income 
above total minimum expenditure, which is given by ( )1r j jjy zα=−∑ . Discretionary income is 
distributed on target groups in line with marginal budget shares βj. For further analysis it is convenient 
to define two special cases of the linear expenditure system. 
 
Condition 1: Exhaustive minimum expenditures (EME). In this case total incomes are just sufficient to 
cover total minimum expenditures, which means that discretionary income equals zero, or 
1
r
j jj
z yα= =∑ . 
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Condition 2: Income elasticities equal to unity. In this case marginal budget shares equal total budget 
shares for all target groups, or ( ), 1,2,...,j j jz y y j rβ = = . 
 
Exhaustive minimum expenditures signify that the sum of minimum expenditures across target groups 
is set as high as possible given the budget constraint. Income elasticities equal to unity implies that 
each target group’s budget share is kept constant as total income is increasing. Moreover, it can be 
shown that either of the conditions 1 or 2 leads to the simplified version of the expenditure system 
(6) ( )
1
, 1,2,..., ,j j j jj r
j j
j
z y z
s j r
y z
α
α
=
= = =
∑
 
where sj is the budget share that is allocated to target group j. Equation (6) states that the budget share 
allocated to each target group is determined entirely by the distribution of minimum expenditure 
shares. The intuition behind equation (6) is that either are total minimum expenditures exhaustive, or 
else discretionary incomes are allocated on target groups in proportion to minimum expenditures. Thus 
the relative priorities across target groups are not assumed to change significantly in response to 
increased total incomes. As will be demonstrated below, this restrictive version of the model has 
sufficient flexibility to accommodate different allocation principles. It follows that the less restrictive 
version in equation (5) allows for the same flexibility. However, the interpretation of minimum 
expenditures is modified if the allocation of discretionary incomes is based on distributional 
preferences that differ significantly from the preferences that determine the distribution of minimum 
expenditures. Such a possibility is discussed briefly in Section 4.5. Yet the analysis of minimum 
expenditures under condition 1 and/or condition 2 proves to throw light on how different types of 
targeting preferences may lead to different expenditure allocations. 
4.1. Equality of treatment 
From equation (6) it follows that yj is equalized across target groups, given the following condition 
 
Condition 3. Joint minimum expenditure. In this case minimum expenditures per person are equal for 
all target groups, j jy jα α≥ = ∀ . 
 
Proposition 1. Assume that condition 1 (exhaustive minimum expenditures) or condition 2 (income 
elasticities equal to unity) is satisfied. Moreover, assume that condition 3 (joint minimum expenditure) 
is also satisfied. Then the solution of the linear expenditure system satisfies equality of treatment (ET). 
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4.2. Equality of outcome 
A public authority that has the discretion to determine minimum expenditures may take into account 
the production functions and abilities of different target groups. Although group-specific expenditure 
is included as arguments in the utility function, it does not follow that the public authority does not 
care about the distribution of final output. To see this, assume that a public authority imposes a 
minimum standard for final output. 
 
Condition 4. Joint minimum standard for final output. In this case the government authority requires 
that jx jτ≥ ∀ , where τ is the minimum standard for final output. 
 
Minimum expenditures corresponding to condition 4 can be deduced from the inverse production 
function 
(7) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1
, 1,2,..., ,
, 1,2,..., ,
j j j j j
j j j
j j
j j
y f x g x j r
x g x
x j r
g x
ε
−
−
= = =
′= =  
where ( )j jg x  is the inverse production function, which in this case is identical to the cost function, 
and ( )1j jxε −  is consequently the elasticity of the cost function. It follows from the properties of 
inverse functions that 
(8) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 , 1,2,..., .j j j j jx j rg xε ε− = =  
Inserting the minimum standard τ  into equation (7) yields the corresponding minimum expenditures 
(9) ( )( ), 1,2,..., .j jg j rα τ= =  
Note that positive marginal productivities imply that marginal costs are positive ( )( ) 0jg j′ ⋅ > ∀ , and 
consequently that the minimum expenditures αj increase as a function of τ. Moreover, a low-ability 
group needs more resources than a high-ability group to produce a given level of final output. 
Therefore minimum expenditures derived from a joint final output standard are decreasing as a 
function of target group ability. This result is displayed in Figure 3 in the case of two different target 
groups with production functions ( )1 1f y  and ( )2 2f y . It is assumed that target group 1 has higher 
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ability than target group 2. In order to meet the joint standard for final output, the derived minimum 
expenditure for group 2 is larger than for group 1 ( )2 1α α> . Thus group 2 is compensated for its lower 
ability to produce final output. 
 
Figure 3. Minimum expenditures derived from a joint minimum standard for final output 
α1 α2Expenditure
Final output
f1 (y1)
f2 (y2)
τ A
B
C
 
 
By inserting equation (9) into (6) and differentiating with respect to τ , the derivative of target group 
j's share of expenditure is given by 
(10) ( )1 1
1
( ) ( ) , 1,2,..., .
r
j j
j j j
j
ds s
s j r
d
ε τ ε ττ τ
− −
=
⎡ ⎤= − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
According to equation (10) a marginal increase in τ will benefit target groups with higher than average 
cost function elasticities evaluated at the minimum standard τ. An interesting question is under what 
conditions a marginal increase in τ will result in a redistribution of expenditure from high-ability 
groups to low-ability groups. 
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Proposition 2. Assume that minimum expenditures are derived from a joint minimum standard for 
final output τ, and that condition 2 (income elasticities equal to unity)  is satisfied. Then an increase in 
τ will induce a redistribution of expenditure towards low-ability groups provided that 
(i) The relationships between different production functions satisfy strong technological 
dominance, and  
(ii) the elasticities of all production functions are non-increasing as a function of expenditure. 
 
Referring to Figure 3 it is relevant to compare elasticities in points A, B and C. From the strong 
technological dominance condition it follows that ( ) ( )2 2 1 2ε α ε α< . From the non-increasing elasticity 
condition it follows that ( ) ( )1 2 1 1ε α ε α≤ . Consequently, ( ) ( )2 2 1 1ε α ε α< and 1 12 1( ) ( )ε τ ε τ− −> . 
Conditions (i) and (ii) imply that the elasticity of the cost function evaluated at τ is decreasing with 
target group ability. Thus one can infer that a marginal increase in τ will benefit low-ability groups at 
the expense of high-ability groups. 
 
Another interesting result for minimum expenditures that are derived from a joint minimum standard 
for final output as in equation (9) is that one may obtain different EO allocations. 
 
Proposition 3. Assume that minimum expenditures are derived from a joint minimum standard for 
final output τ , and that condition 1 (exhaustive minimum expenditures) is satisfied. Then the solution 
of the linear expenditure system satisfies equality of outcome (EO). 
 
By combining equation (9) and condition 1 it follows that τ depends on y as defined by the 
relationship ( )1r EMEj jj z g yτ= =∑ , where EMEτ  is the level of the minimum standard for final output 
that is compatible with exhaustive minimum expenditures. By implicit differentiation one may show 
that EMEτ  is increasing in y. 
4.3. Equality of marginal cost 
Public authorities may also determine minimum expenditures to obtain different EMC solutions. To 
see this, assume that a standard η  is imposed for the first derivative of the cost function. 
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Condition 5. Joint minimum standard for marginal cost. In this case the government authority 
requires that ( )j jg x jη′ ≥ ∀ , which is equivalent to ( ) 1j jf y jη′ ≤ ∀ , where η is the minimum standard 
for marginal cost. 
 
Minimum expenditures corresponding to condition 5 can be deduced from the inverse marginal 
productivity function 
(11) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 , 1,2,..., ,j j j j j j jy h f y f f y j r−′ ′ ′= = =  
Where ( )jh ⋅  is the inverted function of the marginal productivity of target group j. Since the second 
derivative of the production function is negative, it follows that the first derivative is a one-to-one 
function, and consequently the inverse functions in equation (11) exist. Inserting the standard η into 
equation (11) yields the corresponding minimum expenditures 
(12) ( )1 , 1,2,..., .j jh j rα η
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Note that concave production functions imply that ( ) 0jh′ ⋅ < , and consequently that minimum 
expenditures αj are increasing as a function of η. Moreover, technological dominance and concave 
production functions imply that the minimum expenditures in equation (12) are increasing with target 
group ability. 
 
An interesting result for minimum expenditures that are derived from a joint minimum standard for 
marginal cost as in equation (12) is that one may obtain different EMC allocations. 
 
Proposition 4. Assume that minimum expenditures are derived from a joint minimum standard for 
marginal cost η, and that condition 1 (exhaustive minimum expenditures) is satisfied. Then the 
solution of the linear expenditure system satisfies equality of marginal cost (EMC). 
 
By combining equation (12) and condition 1 it follows that η depends on y as defined by the 
relationship ( )1 1r EMEj jj z h yη= =∑ , where EMEη  is the level of the minimum standard for marginal 
cost that is compatible with exhaustive minimum expenditures. By implicit differentiation one may 
show that EMEη  is increasing in y. 
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4.4. Compromises between allocation principles 
So far, the discussion has demonstrated that ET, EO as well as EMC allocations can be obtained by 
changing the distribution of minimum expenditures. Maximization of distributional preferences for a 
given budget constraint includes the three benchmark allocation principles as special cases. Thus, the 
community preference model provides a flexible framework for analyzing different types of 
distributional preferences. Moreover, minimum expenditures could be determined as a compromise 
between any of the three benchmark solutions. For instance, assume that minimum expenditures are 
determined by 
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )11 , 1,2,..., ,EMEj j j EMEg h j rα λ τ λ η⎛ ⎞= + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
where λ is the weight that is put on equity in the equity-productivity tradeoff ( )0 1λ≤ ≤ . The EO 
solution is obtained if 1λ = , and the EMC solution is obtained if 0λ = . By inserting equation (13) 
into equation (6) and differentiating with respect to λ, the derivative of target group j's budget share is 
given by 
(14) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1
,
1 1 1 1
1,2,..., .
EME EME EME EMEr
j j j jj
j jEME EME EME EME
jj j j j
g h g hds
s s
d g h g h
j r
τ η τ η
λ λ τ λ η λ τ λ η=
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥= −+ − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
=
∑
 
Under the assumption of technological dominance ( )EMEjg τ  is decreasing in ability and ( )1 EMEjh η  
is increasing in ability. Consequently a marginal increase in λ will result in a redistribution of 
resources from high-ability groups to low-ability groups. 
4.5. Empirical applicability 
The problem of estimating different target group production functions may face difficulties due to data 
limitations. The data that are required include not only final outputs (or service outcomes) on the level 
of target groups or individual recipients, but also measurement of how expenditures are allocated on 
target groups by the public service producer. 
 
Since output data are not available on a regular basis, one might use the model discussed above to 
provide empirical evidence on governmental priorities across ability types. To estimate the linear 
expenditure system it suffices to have access to expenditure data and the population distribution on 
target groups. Moreover, when the service producing agent is responsible for more than one type of 
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service, it is not required to know the distribution of expenditures on target groups. The linear 
expenditure system extended to account for spending on several service sectors is given by 
(15) 
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,
1,
k r
j ij ij j ij ij j
i j
k r
ij
i j
z y z y z i k j rα β α
β
= =
= =
⎛ ⎞= + − = =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
∑∑
∑∑
 
where ijα  is minimum expenditure per person in target group j in service sector i, ijβ  is the marginal 
budget share for target group j in sector i, and ijy  is expenditure per person in target group j provided 
by service sector i. Assume that ijy  is not reported in accounting data. Nevertheless, minimum 
expenditures can be identified by imposing the following multiplicative structure on the marginal 
budget shares 
(16) 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
, 1,2,..., , 1,2,..., ,
1,
1, 1,2,..., ,
ij i ij
k
i
i
r
ij
j
i k j r
i k
β β θ
β
θ
=
=
= = =
=
= =
∑
∑
 
where iβ  is the marginal budget share for service sector i, and ijθ  is the share of sector-specific 
discretionary incomes in service sector i that is allocated to target group j. Inserting equation (16) into 
equation (15) and aggregating across target groups within each service sector leads to the linear 
expenditure system 
(17) ( )
1 1 1
, 1,2,..., ,
r k r
i ij j i ij j
j i j
y z y z i kα β α
= = =
⎛ ⎞= + − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑∑  
where 
1
r
i j ijj
y z y==∑  is expenditure per person in the population provided by service sector i, which 
is supposed to be reported in accounting data. Due to the additive properties of the linear expenditure 
system, it is thus possible to estimate minimum expenditures for different target groups and in 
different service sectors. Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) used this approach to estimate the 
distribution of minimum expenditures on the basis of expenditure data for Norwegian local 
governments. For instance, they found that mentally disabled children receive a fairly high minimum 
expenditure in primary schools, and moreover that the mentally disabled above school-age receive a 
rather high minimum standard in care for the elderly and disabled. In this case it is plausible to assume 
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that the mentally disabled are technologically dominated by other target groups. Consequently the 
results may suggest that equality of outcome is given a significant positive weight in the equity-
productivity trade-off. However, this weight may as well turn out to fall considerably below 1, as is 
indicated by higher service outcomes in high-ability groups.6 Thus the present paper provides an 
improved foundation for interpreting minimum expenditures. 
 
Another interesting observation is that central governments frequently impose minimum standards on 
local governments that are pertaining to specific target groups. For instance, in Norway a national 
reform in the early 1990s introduced extended legal rights for the mentally disabled that receive local 
public services. Another example is that children below 3 years of age are entitled to be twice as much 
staffed as older children in local public day-care centers. Such regulations may suggest that the central 
government wants to influence the equity-productivity trade-off in the production of local public 
services. Moreover, since regulations are frequently imposed in the form of minimum standards, this 
also justifies that the linear expenditure system provides an attractive framework for interpreting the 
behavior of government decision-makers. 
 
A limitation of the model in equation (17) is that marginal budget share parameters for different target 
groups ( ijθ -parameters) are not identified. Corresponding to condition 2 and equation (6) one can 
assume that 
1
r
ij ij j ij jj
z zθ α α== ∑ . In this case the allocation of discretionary incomes on target 
groups is proportional to target group shares of minimum expenditures.7 Moreover, the minimum 
expenditures express the general priority that is given to different target groups. 
 
However, if the central government is determining minimum expenditures through extensive use of 
regulations and minimum standards, it is possible that minimum expenditures and discretionary 
incomes are allocated differently on target groups. For instance, local governments may have 
distributional preferences that differ from the distribution of minimum expenditures imposed by the 
central government. Consequently, local governments may use discretionary incomes to depart from 
the distributional policy imposed as central government regulations. In that case, the estimated 
minimum expenditures provide information on central government priorities, while the spending 
priorities resulting from local government decisions may differ from central government priorities, 
especially in municipalities with large per capita discretionary incomes. To test such hypotheses it is 
                                                     
6 For instance, test scores of children in Norway are positively related to the education level of parents. 
7 Note that the specification in equation (17) does not restrict income elasticities to equal one on the level of service sectors. 
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required to observe the distribution of spending on target groups, which would allow identification of 
models like equation (5) and equation (15). Provided that this type of data is available, this may 
become an issue for future research. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the allocation of public services on target groups. It is demonstrated that 
production functions for the transformation of public services into service outcomes can be used to 
compare the production process for different target groups. Thus the paper introduces production 
functions that are target group specific. Production of final output (or service outcomes) depends on 
how much expenditure each target group receives and on the ability of each target group to produce 
final output. The comparison between different production functions highlights that there exists a 
trade-off between equity and productivity, provided that the conditions for technological dominance 
are fulfilled. In that case equity considerations imply a high priority of low-ability groups, whereas 
productivity considerations imply a high priority of high-ability groups. 
 
Evidence on governmental priorities across target groups can be obtained from estimation of a linear 
expenditure system. If governmental preferences are guided by equality of treatment (ET), the 
estimated minimum expenditures for different target groups should not differ significantly. The 
interpretation of unequal treatment depends on whether or not technological dominance can be 
assumed. If technological dominance is satisfied, one would expect that estimated minimum 
expenditures decrease with target group ability, provided that government preferences are guided by 
equality of outcome (EO). By contrast, one would expect that estimated minimum expenditures 
increase with target group ability, provided that government preferences are guided by equality of 
marginal cost (EMC). If technological dominance is not satisfied, public authorities are expected to 
give a high priority to target groups with a low initial endowment and a high marginal productivity in 
the production of service outcomes. 
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